The security of the routing infrastructure as a set of protocols and routing process has underpinned much of the past two decades of distributed systems security research. However, the converse is becoming increasingly true. Routing and path decisions are now important for the security properties of systems built on top of the Internet. In particular, BGP poisoning leverages the de facto routing protocol between Autonomous Systems (ASes) to maneuver the return paths of upstream networks onto previously unusable, new paths. These new paths can be used to avoid congestion, censors, geo-political boundaries, or any feature of the topology which can be expressed at an AS-level. Given the increase in use of BGP poisoning as a security primitive for security systems, we set out to evaluate the feasibility of poisoning in practice, going beyond simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Responsible for ensuring packets find their home once they begin their journey, the routing infrastructure serves a key role in ensuring the reachability, availability, and reliability of services on the Internet. Given the importance of its fundamental role, the security of the routing infrastructure as a set of protocols and routing process has underpinned much of the past two decades of distributed systems security research. However, the converse is becoming increasingly true. Routing and path decisions are now important for the security properties of systems built on top of the Internet.
In particular, research has begun to harness the de facto routing protocol on the Internet, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [26] and the functionality it provides to implement new offensive, defensive, and analytical systems. Growing in use, a method known as BGP poisoning has been leveraged by censorship circumvention, DDoS defense, and topology discovery. Rooted in the BGP RFC, BGP poisoning can be used by routing-capable entities. These entities are known on 1 In-submission.
the Internet as Autonomous Systems, or ASes [11] . Fundamentally, BGP poisoning can be used to maneuver an ASes' return traffic around specific AS-to-AS links, new regions of the Internet topology previously not visible to certain ASes, and other regions of interest.
In the domain of censorship circumvention, decoy routing (DR) has become a standard means to avoid censoring eyes [5] , [12] , [15] , [34] , [35] ; though, Schuchard et. al. presented the Routing Around Decoys (RAD) attack [31] , which utilized the routing infrastructure to circumvent decoy routers by using BGP poisoning to completely avoid transiting decoy routers. In response, Houmansadr et. al presented the Waterfall of Liberty system, which demonstrated that RAD could be prevented with downstream decoys [13] , on the assumption that altering downstream paths via BGP poisoning is infeasible, and Goldberg et. al. added additional security guarantees to Waterfall [6] . Beyond censorship, Smith et. al. presented Nyx, a DDoS defense system that leveraged the ability to manipulate inbound traffic paths with BGP for a security purposes: to route around congested links on the Internet [32] . Nyx relies on altering paths on the Internet to circumvent links affected by DDoS, and was evaluated on the entire Internet via simulation. Prior to Nyx, Katz-Basset et. al. demonstrated a similar use of BGP poisoning in practice for single link-failures with LIFEGUARD [17] . Even more fundamental to all forms of network security is the availability of realistic models for the network being studied. To that end, recent work also exploits BGP poisoning techniques to build better models of the Internet's AS-to-AS links and policies [3] , though this could additionally be applied to other properties, such as observing points of congestion with greater path visibility.
The functionality provided by the routing infrastructure of the Internet has stark implications for existing defensive and offensive security systems. In particular, the ability to alter the return or inbound path back to an AS with BGP, termed BGP poisoning, has a growing role within the security domain. Successfully maneuvering incoming traffic off of attacked links is not directly provided via BGP; therefore these systems, RAD, Nyx, and LIFEGUARD, use BGP poisoning to maneuver onto alternate routes throughout the Internet and control which ASes propagate those routes via strategically triggered BGP loop detection. By selectively lying about the networks appearing on the advertised path, an AS-level routing-capable entity can alter the path inbound traffic takes back to it, while always controlling the outbound path. Despite the success of RAD and Nyx in simulation, it was not known to what extent these offensive and defensive measures were effective in practice. On the contrary, defensive strategies in decoy routing such as the Waterfall strategy make the opposite assumption, that controlling the downstream return paths of traffic is difficult in practice.
Accordingly, this paper presents the first collection of novel, Internet-scale, related measurements that address the viability of systems such as RAD, Waterfall, and Nyx. Additionally, we provide insight into utilizing BGP poisoning as a topology and congestion discovery tool. We conducted a roughly 6-month long series of diverse measurements, beginning in January 2018 until July 2018, employing an array of control-plane and data-plane Internet infrastructure. This infrastructure included a collection of ASes from our own organization and the broader Internet via PEERING [30] , a real-world BGP testbed, nearly all responsive and one-per-AS 5k traceroute sources from RIPE ATLAS [2] , and live streams of BGP announcements from RouteViews [29] and the RIPE Routing Information Service [28] . In practice, we found that the Internet's treatment of BGP poisoning lies on a spectrum of behavior when evaluated across 1,400+ active BGP poisoning measurements, conducted with permission from 5 geographically and topologically diverse ASes on the Internet.
Specifically, we find that for 1,460 instances of BGP poisoning, over 77% of the distinct instances could be successfully maneuvered onto new, previously unreachable AS-links at some point in the original path. An average of 8 new links were discovered per path, for a total of 3 completely new paths on average. In 20% of cases, more than 5 completely new paths were discovered, with a maximum of 19 unique paths in one particular case and 23 total new links in another case. Beyond enumerating new paths, we found with that BGP poisoning can be used to route around 80% of ASes with less than 2,500 customers, considered small to mediumsized transit ASes. By further refining these measurements, we uncovered additional cases of BGP poisoning filtering for extremely highly connected ASes such as L3 and Cogent. When poisoning downstream ASes in systems such as Nyx, RAD, and others, connectivity can be lost to the poisoned ASes if a less specific IP block is not advertised to cover for the poisoned AS. In our work, we conducted an assessment of the ability of a poisoning AS without a less specific covering prefix to maintain reachability to the poisoned ASes, finding that 30% of all ASes on the Internet can reach a /25 prefix advertised by an AS with only a /24, which is critical to effective BGP poisoning in an IPv4-dominated Internet. Next, we investigated default routing on the Internet and found that for 36% of ASes with only 2 providers (that is, multi-homed in the simplest case), even when the primary provider is poisoned, the AS will continue to route through it. This finding hints that placing Waterfall resistors nearest the last-mile yields benefits even in the presence of routing-capable censors. Finally, we set out to uncover the raw amount of poisoning that a routingcapable AS can carry out, which has direct implications for the effectiveness of systems such as Nyx in practice. In doing so, we present the first exhaustive path length study, discovering that paths of up to 251 in length are accepted by 99% of the Internet.
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. Section II covers the necessary background on BGP poisoning and security systems which our measurements impact. Section III presents our Internet-Scale BGP poisoning measurement system. Then, Sections IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII explore each measurement in whole starting with the experimental design, then results, and then the implications, challenges, and insight gained from each measurement. Section IX covers the potential ethical concerns of our experiment, as well as how we handled these. This section also presents a brief note on community response from real-world network operators who observed our behavior. Section X defines the work in this area and how our goals and findings are set apart from those previously known. Finally, Section XI summarizes the discoveries and implications for many of the research systems discussed so far, and it concludes with future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
We begin now by covering necessary background for understanding the infrastructure used, analysis conducted, and implications of our study. We first provide the necessary background and terminology for BGP. Then, we describe the use of BGP poisoning by an AS to alter the return paths of traffic inbound to the poisoning AS. Finally, we cover how recent security systems have leveraged BGP poisoning to provide availability and confidentiality to their users.
A. Border Gateway Protocol
As discussed earlier, the Internet is composed of many autonomous systems, or ASes, which are sets of routers and IP addresses under singular administrative control [11] . Each AS has one or more IP prefixes allocated to it, which contain the individual hosts and systems in the AS. These prefixes can contain large amounts of IP addresses (e.g. an /8 or /16 subnet), or they can contain relatively few IPs (e.g. a /24). Today, a /24 is the most specific, or smallest, prefix recommended to be allowed by the most current best practices documents [8] . The Border Gateway Protocol [26] (BGP) is the de facto routing protocol of the Internet. BGP allows the exchange of information between ASes about routes to blocks of IP addresses (e.g. prefixes), allowing each AS to have knowledge of how to forward packets toward their destinations. The exchanged information is known as BGP advertisements and are contained to the control-plane of the Internet, while higher-level TCP, UDP, and other protocols are at the dataplane.
To carry out the routing decision process, BGP harnesses a path-vector routing algorithm with policies. BGP routes, or paths, contain the path they traverse along with other qualities, and individual routers can define their own policies for which routes are considered "best" and then use the preferred routes to forward packets. In practice, these routes are often not the shortest, but rely on the specific policies defined in router configurations. These can include the cheapest route, the most favorable for congestion directly upstream, or any number of preferences a network operator sets for which upstream AS should be used. Relevant to this study, note that BGP includes a "loop detection" mechanism, where a BGP router receiving a new advertisement will first scan the entire path, and if it is already on the path, will drop the advertisement. By dropping the newly seen advertisement, the BGP router will neither use the AS-Path in the advertisement, nor will it forward to the path along to other ASes.
For the purposes of our study, we uncover the Internet's reaction to our operator-sanctioned, comprehensive attempts to alter these configurations, and therefore the best paths between ASes, via a technique known as BGP poisoning.
B. Altering Return Paths with BGP poisoning
With normal BGP, outbound paths can be controlled by selecting an upstream AS to hand traffic to which will then forward traffic along its most desirable path. To determine the paths that will be used, the originating AS can issue traceroutes and other measurements through their available upstreams. Unfortunately, controlling return paths is not nearly as trivial, since the functionality is not built into BGP directly. Though extensions to BGP such as the Multi-Exit Discriminator (MED) [18] allow an AS to ask the immediate upstream AS which of the downstream links to choose, this is often not used in practice and additionally only offers control over the last-mile portion of the return path, not the transit core or other fringes of the Internet. BGP poisoning allows operators of an AS to advertise paths for controlled IP blocks (e.g. the poisoning is not affecting any other entity's traffic, only the traffic bound for the poisoning AS) to the Internet that will not be installed by the ASes being poisoned. In order to cause certain ASes to drop these specific advertisements, the act of BGP poisoning prepends the AS to be avoided onto the end of the advertised path, thus poisoning the path for them. After appending the AS, the poisoning AS also appends its own originating AS to account for the presence of Route Origin Authorization enforcement [14] .
Described in a similar manner in from Smith et. al. and Katz-Bassett et. al., BGP poisoning is illustrated in Figure 1 . In the figure, congestion has overwhelmed the link between AS 3 and AS 4 in Figure 1a , and AS 1 wishes to move the current best path AS 4 takes to AS 1 over to the other available path, via AS 2. Another scenario where AS 1 might wish to move traffic could occur when AS 3 is a decoy router, and AS 4 is attempting to evade the censorship of AS 1. In either case, AS 1 needs to get the return traffic from AS 4 over to the other path. Shown in Figure 1b , AS 1 will now advertise a new AS-Path, but now including the AS to be avoided prepended at the end of the advertised path, effectively "poisoned" by AS 1. This path will then be seen by AS 2 and AS 3. In Figure 1c , this advertisement will propagate past AS 2 to AS 4, but will be dropped at AS 3, since AS 3 sees its own AS number on the path (i.e. recall BGP loop detection from earlier). Now that AS 3 drops the path, it no longer has a route to AS 1, and thus neither does AS 4. Finally, the new path of return traffic swaps to the path via AS 2, achieving the goal AS 1 set out to achieve with poisoning.
Before we proceed, note that future Internet architectures such as SCION provide the ability to control paths in a similar manner [36] to BGP poisoning. Nevertheless, these systems are only in the early stages of evaluation and deployment. To that end, the primary goal of this study is to highlight the viability of BGP poisoning in practice, which is significant to existing security systems in literature. However, these future architectures present novel and effective solutions to problems such as DDoS and censorship, and we hope that our study provides additional insight into the current state of the Internet to which these architectures are being deployed. Additionally, our findings offer insight into the current best mechanisms to achieve the capabilities these future architectures promise.
C. A Question of Feasibility
Before we begin a tour of our systematic and communityapproved experiments, recall that our 6-month long study began with a single question: Is BGP poisoning feasible on the Internet? Not in simulation, and not in simple, localized experiments, but on the entire Internet. It turns out that this question was not simple to answer, at least in whole. This question required the use of an Internet-scale measurement system built to study the properties of the Internet related to BGP poisoning. Our system had to coordinate thousands of traceroute-capable devices across 10% of the ASes on the Internet and 92% of the countries around the world, 5 geographically diverse BGP router locations -including two within Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) and all varying in the number of transit-providers available -and 37 BGP update collectors spread throughout the Internet. For the most complex experiments, where we conducted the entire process of maneuvering return traffic onto new paths, all of the prior mentioned infrastructure required coordination and analysis in real-time.
Next, we will briefly present the infrastructure employed in our study, though we suggest referring back to the diagram as necessary throughout the following sections of experiments. After this, we will begin by discussing the most complex experiment: leveraging BGP poisoning to steer return traffic around ASes.
III. BUILDING AN INTERNET-SCALE BGP POISONING
MEASUREMENT SYSTEM Throughout the discussion of our experiments, we will refer to a common infrastructure diagram depicting the measurement system built to orchestrate experiments. The major components of our measurement infrastructure are shown in Figure 2 , and a table mapping the descriptions of each component below to its respective part of the diagram is shown in Table I . Our detailed software infrastructure documentation and all code for both data collection and analysis will be released and published on GitHub upon acceptance.
Peering and University BGP Routers:
To advertise BGP-poisoned paths to other traffic-carrying ASes, we leveraged ExaBGP due to the relative simplicity of its API and the ability to manipulate BGP advertisements. Our ExaBGP instances were connected to the Internet via two ASes over iBGP, a university AS that will remain anonymous 2 , and 4 BGP routers from PEERING [30] (AS 47065). PEERING is a globally distributed BGP measurement platform run by real-world ISPs and several academic institutions. PEERING originates all advertisements from AS 47065, but our points of entry into the Internet via PEERING span four diverse locations shown in Figure 3 in our study. The university AS has two available transit ASes, and PEERING has 24 available transit ASes. All advertisements were sent to all 24 transit ASes as well as the 300 available peers directly connected to the announcing BGP routers. These peers are available largely in part due to two of the four PEERING routers used in our experiments being part of an Internet Exchange Point, or IXP, specifically AMS-IX and Phoenix-IX. The BGP routers were used in every experiment, though some experiments utilized only the University AS, PEERING, or both (e.g. totaling 5 ASes). Over all experiments, we used eight unique /24 prefixes from PEERING (or 4 /23 prefixes), and two /24 prefixes from the university AS.
BGP Update Collectors
Providing visibility to the BGP Control-Plane, the RouteViews project [29] and RIPE Routing Information Service [28] manage large sets of read-only BGP speakers connected to Internet Exchange Points and universities. These services allow users to query a view into the RIBs of routers located at any of those vantage points. Leveraging BGPStream [23] , a service provided by CAIDA, we collected streaming routing data from RouteViews and RIPE RIS. In particular, this data was used to determine the amount of control-plane updates when confirming poisoned routes spread during path enumeration in Section IV, when measuring the filtering of BGP poisoning advertisements in Section V, and when detecting the reachability of a /25 prefix throughout the Internet in Section VI. Refer to Table I for quick access to this mapping. 2 We will de-anonymize upon acceptance.
RIPE ATLAS Probes
To observe the effects of BGP poisoning from the BGP routers under our control, we utilized RIPE ATLAS's probe infrastructure. RIPE ATLAS is a sensor network run by RIPE NCC which allows users to conduct pings, traceroutes, HTTP GETs, and other functionality from a globally distributed infrastructure of small Linux-based devices. ATLAS has a representation of over 3,600 ASes across 5,000 nodes [27] , covering 91% of the world's countries, and over 10% of the Internet's IPv4 and IPv6 ASes. Figure 4 shows the probe distribution as of 2018.
By communicating with the ATLAS API shown in the infrastructure diagram, Figure 2 , traceroutes and other measurements can be initiated from ASes throughout the Internet destined for any prefix. For our experiments, the traceroute destinations were always IP blocks under our control and advertised by BGP routers under our control. The experiment controller shown at the bottom of the infrastructure diagram initiates both normal and poisoned BGP advertisements via ExaBGP and also issues traceroutes from ATLAS. In a case of successful poisoning, the return traceroute will travel through the Internet along a new return path, shown by the two paths back to AS A through ASes E and G in Figure 2 . Through a secure VPN infrastructure and IP routing rules on the experiment controller, advertisements can be sent out of any connected BGP router described earlier, and any connections back to the experiment IP blocks will be routed back to the controller.
Timing Considerations
To ensure that our advertisements on the control-plane have propagated successfully by the time of traceroutes, our experiments wait at least 2 minutes between measurements after each BGP advertisement, and in some cases 10 minutes if conducted via PEERING infrastructure. These wait times help prevent route-flap dampening [25] , [33] and ensure expiration of minimum route advertisement timers [26] . We highlight additional data on BGP convergence times in the related work under Section X.
In the following sections, we detail our approaches and findings in our study. Each experiment conducted has significant implications for security systems presented in literature to date, from decoy routing systems to DDoS defense systems to link-discovery and congestion-discovery systems. As a whole, the properties of BGP poisoning feasibility that we studied in the upcoming sections are summarized by Table II , including the security systems which the findings affect.
IV. MANEUVERING RETURN PATHS WITH BGP POISONING
We begin our pursuit of BGP poisoning as a security primitive by first examining poisoning as an Internet-scale technique to route around X. X can be ASes, countries, censors, congestion, etc., and in this capacity, BGP poisoning was used in a simulation-based attack to defeat decoy routing [31] and more recently shown to defend against DDoS [32] by Smith et. al., also in simulation. In general, this experiment seeks to answer whether defensive or offensive security systems can rely on an AS to be unable (or able) to route traffic onto alternate paths with poisoning. We finish this section and Infrastructure Component
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Relevant Experiments (from Table II Figure 2 , as well as where each component was used in the study. every remaining experiment section with the implications our findings have for the viability of systems such as RAD [31] , Nyx [32] , Waterfall [21] , LIFEGUARD [17] , continuing work in decoy routing [6] , and Internet model-building by discovering new links, policies, and path performance metrics [3] . We call this measurement path enumeration or path manipulation.
A. Approach to Path Maneuvering
To measure the raw amount of ASes, completely unique paths, and path performance metrics for new paths, we take inspiration from a similar algorithm in prior work using BGP poisoning to investigate inter-AS policies [3] from IMC 2015. However, the work by Anwar et. al. uses multiple routers to advertise similar poisons, thus inferring additional paths. In our work, we are only concerned with the ability of a single instance an AS to maneuver its return traffic.
In general, we iteratively enumerate ASes between poisoning ASes, made up of PEERING and the University AS, and upstream ASes with responsive RIPE ATLAS probes. By using the control-plane to announce poisoned routes and the data-plane with RIPE ATLAS to measure paths back to the poisoning AS, our experiment models a real-world deployer of BGP poisoning and the active route manipulation of inbound traffic. In practice, the algorithm we used mirrors that of the RAD and Nyx systems to emulate the closest-known and accepted security systems in literature.
In total, we conducted this experiment successfully from 1,460 individual ASes as the target AS to maneuver onto new routes, with these target ASes ranging in degree from the most connected AS on the Internet to ASes with only two providers and no customers, or degree 2. First, the poisoning AS, using a single testing prefix per BGP router, advertises the normal path in order to establish connectivity to the rest of the Internet. Then, a traceroute to measure the original path is run from an upstream target AS containing an ATLAS probe back to the poisoning AS. Once the AS-level path has been returned, along with attached latencies, we now begin enumerating ASes along poison, we wait between 2 and 10 minutes to allow the route to propagate. If a path is found with at least one differing AS from the prior traceroute, then the experiment repeats in a breadth-first manner by poisoning both the first upstream AS and the newly discovered upstream AS. Traceroutes and poisoning announcements continue until all combinations of discovered ASes are enumerated and poisoned. In practice, our algorithm terminates when no set of feasible poisons returns a new path following the same process above.
B. Analysis
Challenges abounded while attempting to measure traceroutes from RIPE ATLAS, including failed responses from the ATLAS API, numerous undocumented responses, and unknown and often seemingly random failures. Regardless, we were able to study the feasibility of BGP poisoning as a return path maneuvering mechanism on over 2/3 of the total IPv4 ATLAS ASes, and over 1% of all IPv4 ASes on the Internet that both transit traffic and live at the edge of the topology.
The three primary metrics evaluated by this measurement were: the average diversity of discovered paths, the quantity and distribution of both new paths and ASes discovered, and the difference in latency, or round trip time, between the original path and the alternate discovered paths. The diversity is the fraction of times a particular AS appears in each unique path discovered by BGP poisoning, measured by traceroutes from RIPE ATLAS ASes back to the poisoning AS. Our findings are shown in Figure 5 . Additional metrics are shown in Tables III and IV . Finally, sample sizes are show in in Table V. As shown by Figure 5c , between 2 and 3 completely unique paths could be discovered on average for 1,460 ASes, while roughly 7 ASes could be uncovered along these paths. Clearly, routing around ASes can be done, though the extent to which it can be done is not exhaustive in terms of links shown to exist via CAIDA AS-relationship data [1] path enumeration algorithm used in our work. The implications for work such as Nyx, the DDoS defense system, may still be positive, however. In Smith et. al.'s findings via simulated runs of the system against the CAIDA AS-level topology and a set of bandwidth models, less than 2 paths needed to be searched to find a path with enough capacity to mitigate complete oversubscription on the original attacked path. Their finding is compatible with our finding of the average unique discovered paths. Furthermore, the difference in round trip times via the traceroutes shown in Figure 5b indicated only 0.3% more latency across all samples, giving hope to systems such as Nyx and systems such as RAD that assist in routing a censor's desired traffic around decoys.
However, the story does not tip completely in the favor of anti-DR systems such as RAD. 6 ASes discovered on average may be enough in some cases to route traffic around decoys; however, Waterfall [21] , resistors could likely find strategic locations to place downstream decoys such that a routing-capable adversary leveraging BGP poisoning cannot sufficiently maneuver the evading traffic. The instances where Waterfall would be defeated would be limited to where BGP poisoning is effective at discovering sufficient paths. We suggest future studies that analyze even further more diverse topological placements for poisoning ASes, which could provide systems such as Waterfall additional insight into localized portions of the Internet where BGP poisoning works well in practice. Specifically, an entire study could examine the use of BGP poisoning in practice within close AS-path distance to censoring nations. Given that we have shown the in-simulation ability to route around ASes for as many CAIDA-shown paths exist, simulation-based placement strategies for decoy routing systems would not stand up in practice without a more rigorous backing of the BGP poisoning effects around countries such as China or Syria. Nonetheless, the placement of routers in our study matches the best available locations at the time, and covers 3 continents, including Brazil. PEERING does not currently have routers on the borders or close to the borders of strongly-censoring nations.
Beyond Nyx and Decoy Routing, our findings hint that prior work such as LIFEGUARD should be further improved with more advanced path enumeration strategies beyond localized cloud-to-cloud link failures. Furthermore, our findings on the average diversity of paths shown in Figure 5a display a roughly linear trend in the diversity of paths discovered over our 1k+ samples. We argue that this trend would likely continue for further tested ATLAS ASes, as our study enumerated nearly all degrees of ATLAS ASes, save for the remaining roughly 1,500 ASes mostly with similar degrees of connections to our sample set.
Finally, our findings show that at least for the 1,460 ASes we tested, each AS could gain visibility into the congestion or other properties of roughly 2-3 alternate paths and 6-7 ASes on average. The ability to detect the current performance of previously unused routes could allow operators in practice to know which routes are under the most pressure, and then take action to move their return traffic with BGP poisoning onto the most favorable route. In the same manner, operators can leverage the algorithms shown here to explore AS-to-AS policies for a single AS at a time, unveiling the order in which links will fail over based on the previously unknown 
V. FILTERING OF POISONED ADVERTISEMENTS
Next, we look at the issue of ASes throughout the Internet refusing to propagate paths with poisoned ASes on the path, which we term poison filtering. With this portion of the study, we cast light on the extent to which security systems can rely on BGP poisoning as a primitive for offense and defense, and likewise, the strictness of assumptions security systems which work more effectively when a routing-capable entity cannot easily spread their poisoned routes. The findings we discuss here tie directly into the prior section on routing around ASes and other entities, such as censors, congestion, geopolitical boundaries, etc. As we did in the last section, we end our discussion of poison filtering with the implications its occurrence in practice has on existing security systems in literature, and on the properties future systems should account for when contributing Internet-scale defensive or offensive work to both research and commercial uses.
A. Approach to Detecting Poison Filtering
Recall from the background on BGP that if an AS does not see a path, it will not update its routing state based on that new path. In the same manner as normal BGP advertisements, if a poisoned advertisement meant to poison AS A does not reach AS A because AS D upstream saw the poisoned path first from the poisoning AS and filtered it, then AS A will continue to route along its normal path. If AS A was a decoy router, the poisoning AS has now failed to use BGP poisoning to route around the decoy. With this in mind, we set out to measure the existence of ASes like AS D on the actual Internet.
In our experiment, we sampled 5% of in-use ASes on the Internet by their degree of connectivity, and then we proceeded to advertise poisoned paths with these sampled ASes prepended as the poison (and always surrounded by the originating AS). We were motivated to use the degree of ASes because prior research has found the relative connectivity of an AS often determines its reaction to anomalous Internet events (see the Related Work in Section X). Intuitively, this also seems reasonable, as an AS the size of AT&T with thousands of customer ASes must maintain a certain level of qualityof-service for their customers, unlike fringe ASes which may often solely exist to serve universities, medium-sized regional businesses, or other relatively small enterprises. Quality of service often enforces strict policies with respect to the types of BGP advertisements an AS will accept, how many updates over time from a peer or customer will be allowed before ratelimiting, and other forms of control.
To answer the question of poison filtering's presence, we first announced our normal, non-poisoned prefix to all upstream transits. After waiting 40 minutes for the BGP updates to be collected in whole, we then measured how many unique ASes were observed advertising the original announcement. Though convergence happens nearly instantly, covered later in Section X, we aimed to be thorough in catching every filtering AS in cases where convergence might have taken longer to appear in certain BGP collectors. With a baseline taken, we repeated this process, now poisoning ASes by degree from high to low, testing 5% of ASes at each degree based on CAIDA's data on currently advertised prefixes. After each poisoned announcement, we again waited 40 minutes to collect the same metrics as the baseline, followed by a withdraw of the old poisoned path before starting on the next set of ASes by AS-degree to poison. With the baseline and the post-poison propagation captured, we compute a compatibility factor. This metric measures the fraction of ASes advertising specific poisoned paths versus those who advertised the non-poisoned baseline path from the equivalent originator and prefix. In simple terms, it shows the percentage of time ASes that would normally advertise non-poisoned paths will advertise a path with a poisoned AS prepended (i.e. BGP poisoning as discussed in the background, Section II.)
B. Analysis
The results of this measurement are shown in Figure 6 , with the compatibility factor shown on the left. We have aggregated the compatibility factors into averages in bins of AS degrees from 0 to 99, 100 -199, ..., 2300 -2399. The samples size of each bin are shown in Table VII . In general, for AS degrees of less than 2,500, the compatibility of ASes accepting the poisoned ASes is roughly the same, with between 70% to 80% of ASes continuing to propagate poisons. We did not show the most connected ASes in this figure; however, the top 10 ASes by degree, their compatibility factors with respect to BGP poison filtering, and other relevant AS metadata is shown in Table VI .
The highest degree AS as observed by CAIDA is Hurricane Electric at over 7,000 customer ASes. Hurricane Electric has roughly 20% compatibility compared to ASes with under 2,500 customers at roughly 70% compatibility. The extent to which ASes refuse to propagate high degree poisons is confined to a very small sample of high-degree ASes, specifically only 4 exhibiting compatibilities less than 30%, with AS degrees of 2,538; 4,980; 5,352; and 7,064. Now, what are the implications for BGP poisoning as a security primitive? In practice, systems that rely on BGP poisoning and demonstrate in simulation that any AS can be poisoned, and thus will respect loop-detection, must be reevaluated or considered. This includes systems such as Nyx and RAD. We have shown that significant parts of the Internet may not respect poisoning in certain cases, especially for the small amount of ASes with degrees higher than 1,000, where the compatibility was less than 70%. This finding exemplifies the reason why systems such as Nyx do not find the nearly limitless available paths in practice as actually are shown via CAIDA or other AS-relationship datasets. Since these other datasets leverage hundreds of vantage points and completely different models to what a particular individual AS can route onto, future systems leveraging BGP poisoning cannot be quick to assume all available paths can be used.
Furthermore, the use of BGP poisoning as a security mechanism must take into account the discrepancies in acceptance of poisoned ASes with high connectivity. Furthermore, since the top 10 ASes shown in Table VI are responsible for transiting the vast majority of customers and traffic traveling across ASes, BGP poisoning enabled systems should aim to route around ASes that do not include the most highly connected entities. In the context of the Waterfall decoyrouting system, deployers and evaluators of downstreamdecoy-placement systems should aim to place decoys between the censor and uncensored region where the ASes that provide the greatest diversity would ultimately be incompatible with BGP poisoning due to poison filtering. In scenarios where decoy placement mirrors these strategies, the censors will face a losing scenario. Table VI , the number of customers an AS has, if high, indicates the filtering on the AS may be high, while high degree ASes but low numbers of customers appear in the top 10 as less filtered when used to poison. This property may tilt the game of filtering more in the favor of systems which rely on BGP poisoning to work, in the case when the poisoning AS seeks to maneuver onto available paths via highly connected ASes with low customers, and thus through their peering links. Though rigorous analysis was not completed here, our full results will be published on acceptance.
Shown in
Finally, even though our measurements sampled nearly all ATLAS probes for ASes by every degree observed on the Internet, we cannot claim that this applies to the other 95% of ASes outside of ATLAS. Therefore, future and ongoing research into the construction of BGP poisoning enabled security systems should not hold the strict assumption that any AS more highly connected than 2,500 shown by the Figure 6 will be filtered.
VI. MAINTAINING CONNECTIVITY
To continue our study, we now present our findings on the reachability of a /25 prefix on the Internet, a behavior that if present would strengthen the case for BGP poisoning as a primitive for defensive or offensive systems. Recall that in order for packets on the Internet to return home, the routers which they traverse must have a path to the destination prefix. When a poisoning AS essentially blacklists their path from a particular AS, then the blacklisted AS will no longer have a path to the poisoning AS, unless a less specific covering prefix exists. If the poisoning AS has a less specific prefix, then anyone that has the path tied to it, such as a /23 over /24, Figure 6 .
will still have a path back to the poisoning AS even though their AS is poisoned on the more specific /24. Because of this, we investigated the current state of Internet with respect to which ASes have more than a /24, and which ASes only have a /24.
By examining the IP block allocations from the Internet numbers authority, IANNA, we find that a maximum of 48% of ASes only have a /24 available for use. This implies that if any of these ASes wish to exploit BGP poisoning, then they will lose connectivity to any poisoned ASes, that is unless they can use a non-standard /25 prefix [8] as the poisoned prefix and the /24 as the covering prefix. However, current best practice documents recommend ASes filter anything more specific than a /24, and using a /25 en masse could significantly impact the fragmentation of the available address space. To that end, we sought to examine what amount of connectivity a /24-only poisoning could retain, at least until IPv6 is deployed universally within the BGP ecosystem.
A. Approach to Measuring Visibility and Reachability of a /25
With 8 prefixes, we announced a /24 first to measure a baseline compatibility factor in the same manner as the previous experiment on poison filtering. After 96 hours, the ASes that advertised the /24 to the rest of the Internet and were seen via collectors was noted. Next, we announced a /25 prefix from the same locations, collecting the number of updates in the same manner over the same amount of time. With this, we could see how many total BGP collectors saw the /25. We indicate the results from these investigations in Table VIII .
From the data-plane perspective, we announced a /25, then scheduled 5,000 traceroutes per hour for 7 hours from globally distributed (randomly chosen by the ATLAS API) nodes. We then recorded the fraction of times the traceroutes reached the /25, noting this as the approximate reachability of the /25. We opted not to do the traceroutes for the /24 both due to access to PEERING being used for other experiments and additionally because we have no intuition for why a /24 could not be reached apart from faulty ATLAS probes. The results are also shown in Table VIII .
B. Analysis
In the context of censorship circumvention, any censor that does not have a less specific prefix than a /24 will be unreachable via poisoned ASes if conducting a path maneuvering attack. Though this may not be an issue for censorship entities in general, smaller censoring nations may sustain significant economic costs by losing connectivity to certain ASes, due to their already meager amount of external connectivity. When poisoning is used for defense, operators must be willing to sustain significant loss of connectivity with additional ASes poisoned, which is often the case in techniques used by systems such as Nyx to prevent what Smith et. al. terms "disturbance", or poisoning additional ASes to prevent mass amounts of path changes to the Nyx-deploying AS.
In the context of building better models via enhanced topologies, bandwidth models, and AS-preference mappings, the loss of connectivity is less relevant. An AS purely using BGP poisoning as a means to gain greater visibility into the Internet, whether for security or another measurement purpose, may have additional prefixes for production traffic and would likely not need connectivity to intermittently poisoned paths used for diverse path measurements.
Finally, we clarify that the findings presented on maintaining connectivity with a /25 do not apply to an Internet where IPv6 is completely deployed. Since IPv6 blocks can be allocated with far less restrictions on their potential exhaustion than IPv4, ASes without the ability to maintain connectivity to poisoned ASes will not suffer this issue in an Internet deployment where every AS routes IPv6 traffic, and thus every AS has additional default-free prefixes available to deploy for use in BGP poisoning.
VII. DEALING WITH DEFAULT ROUTES
Following the previous section on maneuvering the return paths with BGP poisoning, we collected additional data on a behavior within Internet routing known as default routes. Default routes have important repercussions for the Waterfall of Liberty system and Nyx in particular. We will now describe how the default route metrics were collected, which is simply a small piece of the larger path maneuvering experiment described above in Section IV. Then, we highlight the implications a default-routed Internet would have on systems such Briefly, default routes are an instance where an AS, AS A , may have more than one upstream, AS B and AS C ; however, when AS B , the normal upstream, is poisoned by a downstream AS, AS D , and drops the path to AS D , AS A continues to route along the path through AS B . Termed as a "default route", and has been studied most recently in 2009 by Bush et al. [7] and briefly by Katz-Bassett in LIFEGUARD [17] . Since our Internet-scale infrastructure already collects this information, we will now present our findings, reflecting on the changes to the Internet's default routing presence in the past decade as well as the implications the current state has for security systems.
As shown by Table IX , we found that default routes existed for 26.8% of the transit ASes we sampled, those being ASes with 5 or more customers. We also found that 36.7% of the fringe ASes, or those with less than 5 customers, had default routes. In practice, the existence of default routes has significant effects on the assumptions that can be made within simulated instances of BGP poisoning, as well as systems that expect poisoning to function as normal Internet behavior. Based on the 36% of fringe ASes with default routes, this indicates that systems, such as Waterfall and other anti-censorship mechanisms, must attempt to optimize placement of decoys at the fringes of the network, since an adversary leveraging BGP poisoning will have less control over manipulating the immediate upstream ASes on the return path. Thus, these censors will be unable to steer traffic around the decoys deployed by Waterfall. Once again, placement of censorship resistors is heavily affected by the findings we present.
VIII. ADVERTISING EXTREMELY LONG PATHS
The final component of our Internet-scale study explores the maximum path length capable of being advertised via BGP. This property has a critical role in systems which not only need to propagate poisons, but propagate poisoned paths with many poisons. Included in relevant applications of this property is the use of many poisons to prevent disturbance in Nyx [32] , avoid multiple censors at once in RAD [31] , and explore the depths to which paths can be enumerated from both our earlier experiments and additionally in related literature to explore inter-domain AS preferences [3] . In order to measure to what extent the Internet respects long paths, we have conducted what we believe is to date the most exhaustive measurement of path length propagation. Since the Internet's average path length is roughly 3.7 [4] , and documentation suggests limiting the length of AS-paths to 50 ASes in some cases, this measurement presented a challenge. Fortunately, we were able to conduct this experiment from the University AS over two transit links, without being restricted to a path length of PEERING-imposed 15-maximum number of poisons.
A. Approach to Propagating Extremely Long Paths
Similar to prior experiments, we announce a normal baseline path with no poisons. Then, after collecting the baseline ASes advertising the normal path, we iteratively poison paths of increasing lengths, from 1 poisoned AS prepended to the path to 135 poisons. Once we reached 135 poisons, we shifted to poisoning in successive iterations of 5, and then from 135 to 500. In practice, the path would look similar to the path in Equation 1, where AS I , AS J , and AS K are normal ASes forwarding the prefix; AS Orig is the poisoning AS; and AS P1 through AS Pn are the prepended poisons.
We conducted this experiment with both in-use, randomly sampled ASes from the CAIDA topology to most closely mirror a long, poisoned path in practice on the Internet, as well as an experiment of the same methodology but using the originating AS as the prepended portion. Additionally, we ensured part of the in-use AS sample included both ASes on the edge of the topology (those with no customers), as well as transit ASes small and large (those with more than 5 customers), according to prior classifications of AS types by UCLA [22] . After waiting 40 minutes proceeding each increment of additional poison length, we measured the compatibility factor for increasing path lengths filled purely with poisoned ASes. In total, these experiments were conducted over the course of several days.
B. Analysis
Displayed in Figure 7 for the self-appended AS experiments and Figure 8 for the more realistic experiments, we have provided a rigorously evaluated upper bound on the max path Figure 8 also matches an operator's intuition that as paths grow longer, they are less accepted throughout the Internet, though still roughly 75% of BGP collectors from RouteViews and RIPE RIS observed the longest path lengths detected. Though our experiment continued to advertise to our immediate upstreams for path lengths of up to 500 poisons long, these advertisements were filtered by the University's upstream transit-providers.
With this critical information, systems such as Nyx now have an upper bound on which to base the amount of avoided ASes used at any given time. Since Smith et al. did not limit the poisons, their work should be re-evaluated with a more realistic upper bound on poisons to determine to what extent a DDoS defense system relying on BGP poisoning can actually prevent mass amounts of path changes as a side-effect. For systems that infer previously unknown Internet topology relationships, the maximum length of 251 poisoned ASes serves as a constraint on path enumeration strategies. With respect to systems such as LIFEGUARD, when attempting to route around many localized failures, as Katz-Bassett et al. did between Amazon AWS instances, this maximum length limits the amount of rerouting in practice that can be achieved. The implications for systems such as RAD follow: the more poisons possible, the less constraints on which ASes can be avoided. Of course, all prior findings should be taken into account with respect to other in-practice nuances of BGP poisoning as a security primitive.
IX. NOTE ON ETHICS AND COMMUNITY RESPONSE
Though BGP poisoning is a well-known, accepted traffic engineering technique described in the BGP RFC [26] , caution was still taken when poisoning was conducted out of any router. Recall that BGP poisoning only directly affects the path traffic already destined for the poisoned AS. It is feasible that large amounts of re-routed traffic could impact normal traffic flowing along non-poisoned/non-altered return paths; however, traffic levels in our experiments were never more than 10 MB/s at peak. Outside of poisoning, we only conducted the /25 experiment for 8 prefixes, and then withdrew them after completion.
For every experiment, appropriate care was taken to notify various groups of our activity and unusual BGP advertisements. We notified the NANOG and RIPE NCC mailing lists, as well as kept in constant touch with the PEERING and University network operators to address any concerns from downstream ASes receiving poisoned paths. At the most disruptive points (in terms of number of updates being sent from the 5 BGP speakers), 4 emails were received from operators on the Internet, all when conducting the extremely long path experiment.
In detail, we received emails from network operators at Hurricane Electric, the Linux Foundation, Carpathia (a small ISP), and a security researcher from Yahoo!/Oath. None of the operators attributed malice to the discovery of our anomalous path advertisements, though several warned us that our routers were behaving oddly and that we should investigate them. When we received an email pointing out our router's behavior, we immediately took steps to reduce the amount of poisons we would try at once, the number of updates during a given amount of time, and additionally not poisoning the complaining ASes specifically.
This revealed yet another insight: even among the network operator community, BGP poisoning can often be mistaken for router-error, and not intentional operator actions. Furthermore, one researcher, whose anonymized email 3 is shown in Figure 9 , noted that the long path announcement experiment gave reminder to the 2009 incident where an AS announced paths longer than 255 consistently for nearly an hour, causing many unstable routers on the fringe of the Internet to crash [9] . The other three anonymized emails are shown in the Appendix in Figure 10 . where RAD would no longer work under the assumption controlling return paths downstream of the censor is difficult [13] , which led to additional work by Goldberg et. al. as well as work from others [6] , [19] . Prior work by Houmansadr et. al. also showed the costs of RAD in practice [20] , while Gosain et. al investigated placing Decoy Routers to intercept the most traffic [10] . In defense systems, BGP poisoning has been leveraged to provide DDoS resistance with Nyx from Smith et. al. [32] and LIFEGUARD by Katz-Bassett et. al. [17] .
X. RELATED WORK

Security Uses of BGP poisoning
Other Studies of BGP poisoning
The most closely related measurement to our work is LIFE-GUARD from Katz-Bassett et. al. [16] , [17] ; though, this work addressed routing around link failures within parts of the Internet measured via Amazon EC2. The path enumeration algorithm in LIFEGUARD is similar to the one used here; however, the algorithm used in our work did not prepare the BGP topology for convergence by advertising similar path lengths without poisoning. Despite this, our measurements still found alternate paths of similar or greater length to their study.
BGP Convergence, Route-Flap Dampening, and Poisoning
In practice, the issue of BGP's convergence time might present issues; in spite of this concern, BGP advertisements of similar structure to those generated by our measurements propagated and converged instantly for 94% of cases, according to prior work by Katz-Bassett et. al. [17] . Additionally, the BGP RFC states that 30 seconds is the recommended time to hold routes in the update phase [26] , and similar to LIFEGUARD, we found our routes converged even faster in nearly all 1,460 instances of BGP poisoning path-enumeration experiments. Furthermore, recent work has found that penalties to many updates sent at once, otherwise known as route-flap dampen-ing, is no longer widely deployed in practice [24] , and current BGP RFCs recommend changing the algorithm for dampening to be less restrictive.
Measuring the Internet's Topology with BGP poisoning Anwar et. al. used BGP poisoning to enumerate alternate paths between ASes from multiple vantage points [3] , uncovering additional policies between ASes in practice that datasets such as the inferred AS-relationships from CAIDA did not observe. Bush et. al. conducted measurements in 2009 exploring the propagation of /25 prefixes on the Internet and data-plane reachability [7] . Unlike our study, their work used pings from the /25 prefix to other ASes in order to determine reachability, whereas our work examines this problem with traceroutes. At the time of their study, the Internet was also composed of only 25,000 ASes, compared to 60,000+ now. By advertising a /25 and then measuring pings to those ASes from the /25, they found that less than 1% of RIPE BGP collectors saw the /25 prefix. Bush et. al. also sent pings from the advertised /25 IP space to an IP in every AS across the Internet and observed that nearly 5% of ASes still had reachability to the /25 prefix. Based on our findings earlier in measuring connectivity via traceroutes, in Section VI, we find now that the data-plane reachability of a /25 has risen to roughly 30%, while the BGP updates for a /25 climbed to over 50%, or 50x more than that of 2009.
XI. CONCLUSION
We have presented the first collection of novel, Internetscale, related measurements that address the viability of systems such as RAD [31] , Waterfall of Liberty [21] , and Nyx [32] . After conducting a roughly 6-month long series of diverse measurements, beginning in January 2018 until July 2018 and employing an array of control-plane and data-plane Internet infrastructure, we uncovered the feasibility of using BGP poisoning in practice. Our findings shed light on the cautions, approaches, and assumptions both existing and new systems should take with respect to the security primitives a routing-capable entity can employ.
Notably, we found 77% of ASes evaluated could be successfully maneuvered onto new, previously unreachable ASlinks at some point in the original path. We found that of all types of AS connectivity, only highly connected ASes were strictly incompatible with BGP poisoning. When poisoning an AS, we demonstrated that for roughly 30% of the Internet, using non-standard IPv4 prefixes will maintain connectivity when no other routable prefixes are available. Beyond connectivity, we investigated default routing on the Internet and found that for 36% of ASes with only 2 providers, even in cases where the primary provider is poisoned, the AS being maneuvered will continue to route through the poisoned upstream AS. Finally, we established the first upper bound on the maximum ASpath length routable on the Internet via an exhaustive search, discovering that paths of up to 251 in length are accepted by 99% of the Internet when considering the customer cones of ASes advertising such paths.
With these findings, our study called out specific assumptions that are now either validated or in question for systems such as Nyx, RAD, Waterfall, and others. In particular, the placement of decoy routers can effectively quell the impact of a RAD adversary, while poorly placing decoy routers in the core of the Internet leaves censors with vast territory to intercept traffic. For defense systems such as Nyx, we demonstrated that to some extent, the ability to defend against DDoS under their presented bandwidth models hold; however, the assumptions made about the amount of poisons possible overall and the specific ASes on the Internet able to be poisoned require significant changes to their described algorithms in order to see real-world viability in the range of cases our study shows. Beyond Nyx, RAD, Waterfall, and decoy routing, the study we have presented carries implications for potential alleys to better Internet model-building and other Internet simulation systems.
Future Work:
In future experiments, we aim to improve the path enumeration algorithms significantly, borrowing inspiration from more advanced strategies employed by the LIFEGUARD system on an Internet-wide scale. Additionally, though we have completed early work in measuring the ability for BGP poisoning to function under different conditions of secure BGP protocols, we leave a complete exploration of this to future studies. Finally, we aim to work again with the PEERING team and other researchers in this space to build upon our study and add other measurements to the picture, most notably more robust path latency or congestion metrics. 
